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Abstract 
The study of deductive reasoning has been a major research paradigm in psychology 
for decades. Recent additions to this literature have focused heavily on 
neuropsychological evidence. Such a practice is useful for identifying regions 
associated with particular functions, but fails to clearly define the specific interactions 
and timescale of these functions. Computational modelling provides a method for 
creating different cognitive architectures for simulating deductive processes, and 
ultimately determining which architectures are capable of modelling human reasoning. 
This thesis details a computational model for solving categorical syllogisms utilizing a 
fractionated system of brain regions. Lesions are applied to formal and heuristic 
systems to simulate accuracy and reaction time data for bi-lateral parietal and 
frontotemporal patients. The model successfully combines belief-bias and other known 
cognitive biases with a mental models formal approach to recreate the congruency by 
group effect present in the human data. Implications are drawn to major theories of 
reasoning.  
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Introduction 
Reasoning is the cognitive activity of combining and processing given information 
to generate inferences. Inferences take one or more propositional statements 
comprised of the given information (the premises) to provide justification for accepting 
some conclusion. When the given information presents a complete picture of a situation 
this is ideally a deductive reasoning process. Deductive reasoning – sometimes referred 
to as top-down logic – applies general law-like rules to information in order to build 
down to or establish what must be true about a specific instance. In contrast, inductive 
reasoning (bottom-up logic) takes specific instances of information and attempts to build 
up to possible general rules. The conclusions of inductive reasoning are always open 
the possibility of being wrong due to generalization from an incomplete problem space. 
Deductive arguments, however, can be deterministically evaluated in terms of their 
validity. If a deductive argument is valid, the conclusion is a logical entailment of the 
premises which must be true assuming that the premises themselves are true. 
As an example of inductive reasoning, if one has observed a large number 
swans to all be white then one may take these specific experiences to suggest a 
general rule that all swans are white. In deductive reasoning, a general rule may state 
that all swans are white. If a creature is a swan, it logically and unavoidably follows that 
the creature is white. This is true provided that the general rule is actually correct and 
not built from inductive reasoning processes.  
Deductive reasoning possesses a special quality where its inferences are 
separable from its content. We can do this with the above argument by representing 
swans with X and the property of whiteness with Y. If All X are Y, then if some token 
creature Z is X it must also be Y. The ability to separate these conclusions from their 
content is what, according to Goel (2009), makes deductive reasoning a good candidate 
for being a self-contained higher-level cognitive reasoning module. 
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1.1 Single or Multiple Module Reasoning 
Theories regarding the structure of reasoning processes in the brain can invoke 
single deductive reasoning modules, or a collection of modules. Mental logic (Rips, 
1994) and mental models (Bucciarelli & Johnson-Laird, 1999; Johnson-Laird, 1983) 
represent two prominent theories of single deductive reasoning modules. The two 
theories diverge in how they represent information, and the neural networks these 
representations would invoke. Mental logic theories suggest reasoners understand the 
inferential role of logical terms (all, some, no, if, and, or, etc.) and that a linguistic 
representation of these terms is what drives processing. As the procedure for mental 
logic involves rules of inference applied to syntactic strings, it should demonstrate 
engagement of left prefrontal and superior temporal brain regions for language-based 
information processing (Goel, 2009). In contrast, mental model theories suggest we 
build spatially-based mental representations of potential situations to comprehend and 
process logic problems. Results supporting a mental model theory would instead show 
recruitment of a visuospatial (parietal/occipital) network (Barbey & Barsalou, 2009; 
Goel, 2005). 
 If reasoning in the human brain is instead characterized as a collection of 
modules, this collection may cooperate to perform inductive heuristic-based reasoning 
on information present in the problem, as suggested by the simple heuristics 
(Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999) paradigm. However, it may instead be organized so that 
specific modules in the collection to respond to particular cues in a somewhat reflexive 
manner suggested by the massive modularity (Fodor, 1983; Carruthers, 2006) 
paradigm.  
Under the simple heuristics view, all reasoning is performed by an interconnected 
collection of fast and frugal heuristics. Gigerenzer and Todd (1999) specify three sets of 
heuristics which together form a computationally cheap solution for any reasoning 
problem. The first set involves heuristics for guiding the search for alternatives of choice 
and their relevant information. The second involves heuristics for stopping the search 
procedure. The last involves heuristics for actually making the decision from among the 
alternatives found. Simple heuristics appeal to evolution in their genesis; it is said 
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evolution would “seize upon informative environmental dependencies […] and exploit 
them with specific heuristics” (Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999) which may either be new, or 
the result of recombining or nesting old heuristics. 
Massive modularity suggests the reasoning mind is a fractionated collection of 
specialized reasoning modules tuned to specific tasks. Evolutionary psychologists 
supporting a highly modular view of the mind (Cosmides & Tooby, 1992; Pinker 1997; 
Sperber, 1994) suggest evolution incrementally added to this repertoire of reasoning 
modules: this includes modules for  “semantic inference, communicative pragmatics, 
social exchange, intuitive numbers, spatial relations, naïve physics, and biomechanical 
motion” (Barbey & Barsalou, 2009). These modules apply a small number of inputs to a 
limited internal database in the generation of output. In processing only a limited range 
of input such modules are said to be informationally encapsulated. This is bears the 
consequence of cognitive impenetrability, meaning that we are not consciously aware of 
nor able to influence their processing. To exhibit these traits, strong modular views 
predict neural systems of reasoning to be highly localized. 
These two divergent theories arise from a similar desire to overcome the problem 
of computational intractability. Simon (1983; 1991) introduces the notion of bounded 
rationality in stating that finding an optimal solution to decision-making problems (such 
as through pure deduction) is too expensive. We have limited time, memory, and 
processing ability with which to make decisions, and as such we cannot evaluate all 
possible alternatives. If finding the best solution is unfeasible, we must make due with 
approximate methods for quickly finding solutions that are good enough. Combining the 
words “satisfy” and “suffice”, Simon (1955) terms this approach satisficing. This 
represents the idea that once an alternative is found that is appealing enough to meet 
some aspiration level we stop our search and go with that alternative.  
Gigerenzer and Todd (1999) incorporate this satisficing heuristic among others in 
the decision-making process to limit the problem space – the amount of information 
considered – and arrive at cheap yet effective decisions. The massively modular 
approach limits the problem space using specialized modules with limited 
interconnectivity to respond to particular cues and information in a particular way 
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without analyzing all possible information. However, in an attempt to reduce 
computational complexity and facilitate fast decision-making, these two views have 
seemingly given away the ability to try and find exact solutions altogether – the capacity 
for deductive reasoning. The massively modular account fragments and isolates the 
reasoning mind to the point where deliberate analytical investigation becomes 
insupportable. Meanwhile, a reasoning system built purely from heuristics seems only 
capable of supporting a sense of intuition guided by environmental cues. Whether our 
reasoning is driven by rigid and reflexive responding in a cognitively impenetrable way, 
or through purely inductive intuition, neither of these approaches appear to be coherent 
with our normative views of rationality. Namely, that a rational choice is not simply a 
selection, but a selection for a reason (Bermudez, 2002), which implies reasoning is a 
thoughtful process, unlike that of an eye-blink reflex (Goel, 2009). 
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1.2 Dual-system theory 
Dual-system theory (Evans 2003; Evans & Over, 1996; Stanovich 2004) provides 
space for the collective module approaches under the branding of system 1, and 
deductive reasoning processes like mental models or mental logic under system 2. 
System 1 provides a collection of parallel-processes which have been considered fast, 
automatic, or associative. This system can contain rigid and evolutionarily-specified 
processing modules similar to the informationally encapsulated Fodorian modules. It 
can also encompass the fast and associative heuristics processing system (De Neys, 
2006). Formal rules, stimulus discrimination, and decision-making choices practiced to 
the point of automaticity (Kahneman & Klein, 2009) can also be said to be a part of 
System 1. As such, later clarifications of dual-system theory (Evans & Stanovich, 2013; 
Stanovich 2011) suggest system 1 is considered as a plurality of autonomous systems. 
System 2, by contrast, is a slower serial process that is more often rule-based. It 
is far more limited in its processing capacity in requiring considerable conscious 
thought, effort, and working memory resources. It is through this system that true logic-
based reasoning approaches are executed. The two systems are sometimes supposed 
to have a default-interventionist (Evans 2007) structure, which specifies that System 1’s 
intuitive responses are the default upon which System 2 may or may not intervene. 
Other theorists (Barbey & Sloman, 2007) suggest a parallel-cooperative structure with 
each system providing its input with a following conflict resolution process. The current 
variation in dual-system theory is quite large; in its most explicit state, each system may 
be ascribed numerous attributes including the characterization of system 1 as the 
evolutionarily “old mind”, and system 2 as the “new mind”. At its more conservative side, 
System 1 represents various autonomous processes while System 2 requires 
substantial working memory resources and hypothetical thinking (e.g. thought 
experiments/model building) – the latter demand which Stanovich (2011) calls cognitive 
decoupling. 
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1.3 Current Neuropsychological Data 
 Current neuropsychological findings from brain imaging data (Goel et al., 2000) 
have shown a number of divisions in the networks recruited when reasoning. These 
differences emerge depending upon whether or not the content of problem is familiar to 
reasoners, whether the content is in conflict with held beliefs or not, and differing when 
the reasoning problem is presented in an informationally complete or incomplete 
manner. These findings undermine the acceptance of a single reasoning system like 
mental models or mental logic, and suggest a diverse collection of brain regions 
involved in logical reasoning.   
 Common methodology employed in past research investigating the neural basis 
of reasoning, such as having subjects solve puzzles or perform other tasks while 
undergoing brain imaging, is good at identifying neural systems involved in reasoning, 
but it does little explain the interactions between these systems. A double-dissociation 
in lesion studies can tell us that some brain area is important to some task A but not B, 
and that another area is important to task B but not A; this brings the suggestion that 
these areas support some different underlying mental function (Dunn & Kirsner, 2003) – 
though precisely how an area contributes, or the time-scale or steps of the function 
generally can be difficult to determine. These questions remain open. 
Computational modelling is one way of representing a complex interaction of 
different modules to answer these questions. Different models can more precisely 
describe how these areas may function, and their results can be compared to 
neuropsychological data or the data of other computational models. The present thesis 
provides a computational model of deductive reasoning along the lines indicated by 
imaging data, and tests its predictions by comparing how it performs (in terms of 
accuracy and reaction time) under conditions of simulated lesion with that of archival 
lesion data from the Vietnam head injury study (VHIS).   
 Imaging studies have shown a division in the brain networks recruited depending 
upon whether the material is familiar or not, otherwise known as the content effect (Goel 
et al., 2000). In the cited study, eleven subjects solved categorical syllogisms (a type of 
deductive reasoning problem) by indicating the problems to be valid or invalid; 
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propositional statements possessed familiar and meaningful content (e.g. “All swans are 
white”) or unfamiliar content (e.g. “All X are Y”). A left-lateralized frontal-temporal 
language system (BA 21/22/47) appears to preferentially process familiar and 
conceptually-coherent material (see Figure 1), while a bilateral parietal visuospatial 
system (BA 7/40) processes unfamiliar or content-free material (see Figure 2). In both 
familiar and unfamiliar conditions the left prefrontal cortex is also active, evidencing its 
value to general reasoning process. 
 It has been described that the validity of deductive reasoning problems are 
independent of their content. As the activation patterns in the brain diverge depending 
upon the content of the syllogisms, this suggests purely deductive processes – such as 
through the use of only mental models or mental logic processes – fail to fully describe 
reasoning over these types of problems. Furthermore, while mental models theory 
predicts visuospatial systems to be necessary and sufficient conditions for deductive 
reasoning and mental logic theories predicts linguistic systems to be necessary and 
sufficient, these predictions fail to hold across conditions of familiar and unfamiliar 
content. Dual-system theories thus far would still hold by relegating familiar content 
activations to System 1 heuristic operations and the bi-lateral parietal recruitment to 
System 2 rule-based operations. 
Reasoning with familiar material       Reasoning with unfamiliar material  
 
Figure 1          Figure 2   
 (reproduced from Goel et al., 2000) 
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 Another aspect to the effect of content on logical reasoning is that subject 
performance is significantly higher when the deductive validity of the problem is 
consistent with held beliefs, and considerably lower when it is not. A valid conclusion 
suggesting “All men are mortal” would be congruent with held beliefs, while a valid 
conclusion stating “All men are evil” would, hopefully, contradict held beliefs. Inhibitory 
or incongruent trials, where the validity of the problem does not match held beliefs, 
show different patterns of activation depending upon the success of the subject. When 
conflict between logical inference and belief is detected, belief-bias responding must be 
inhibited and formal reasoning mechanisms are to be given preference. Conflict 
detection is associated with activation of right lateral/dorsal lateral prefrontal cortex (BA 
45, 46) (see Figure 3; Goel & Dolan, 2003), whereas belief-biased responding is 
associated with ventromedial prefrontal cortex activation. 
  
Figure 3 
 The final aspect of the deductive reasoning system to be discussed involves a 
hemispheric asymmetry in reasoning with complete versus incomplete information. Goel 
et al. (2006) utilized a 3-term transitive inference task to test neurological patients with 
focal unilateral frontal lobe lesions. A double dissociation was found where patients with 
lesions to the left prefrontal cortex were selectively impaired on complete (determinate) 
trials, and patients with right prefrontal cortex lesions were impaired in incomplete 
(indeterminate) trials (see Figure 4). Figure 5 displays the behavioural results for this 
study (Goel et al., 2006). This functional dissociation between left and right prefrontal 
9 
 
cortex is difficult to reconcile with previously explored theories of deductive reasoning; 
they do not necessitate neuronal system differences depending upon complete or 
incomplete information. 
 
Figure 4 (reproduced Goel et al., 2006) 
 
Figure 5 (reproduced Goel et al., 2006) 
Goel (2009) puts forth a new framework for conceptualizing the deductive 
reasoning system to better explain current neuropsychological data, and break down 
the dichotomous implications of many dual mechanism theories. Termed as a 
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fractionated system of deductive reasoning, it combines a left prefrontal cortex general 
pattern completer with right prefrontal cortex systems for conflict detection and 
uncertainty maintenance; it includes a left frontal-temporal system for heuristic or 
conceptual processing, and a bilateral parietal system for formal operations (see Figure 
6). These divisions may of course not be the complete list of what may be found for the 
deductive reasoning system, but it is a step towards a more dynamic and interactive 
connection of systems than can be provided by any other account – including dual 
mechanism theories. In featuring a number of systems able to inhibit or facilitate the 
activity of others, a much greater degree of variability in performance can be generated. 
This is particularly important for explaining deductive reasoning processes for solving 
categorical syllogisms, as a study by Bucciarelli and Johnson-Laird (1999) found the 
best participant to be correct on 95% of problems, and the worst to be correct only 25% 
of the time. 
  Figure 6 
Categorical syllogisms are the type of reasoning problem for which control and 
patient data will be used to test the computational model. They are one type of 
deductive reasoning problem as they provide an informationally complete picture of the 
problem space. Categorical syllogisms consist of two premises and a conclusion. Each 
premise establishes relations between two terms (x and y) in one four ‘moods’ (A, E, I or 
O) where A = All x are y, E = No x are y, I = Some x are y, and O = Some x are not y. A 
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& E are universal moods describing how all x relate to y, while I & O are particular 
moods describing only how some x relate to y. Each premise must contain one ‘end 
term’ (a or c) and one ‘middle term’ (b), where the middle term is used to logically 
connect the premises so that the conclusion can state some relation between the two 
‘end terms’ using one of the four syllogistic moods. There are also four figures which 
represent the possible orders in which the terms may occur in the premises. This allows 
for a total of 256 distinct forms for the categorical syllogism. In the example below, the 
premises and conclusion are set in the A mood. The middle term (B – the term present 
in both premises) allows us to determine relations between pigeons (C) and flight (A). If 
all birds are capable of flight, and all pigeons are birds, then all pigeons can fly. 
Example Categorical Syllogism:      Abstract Terms 
Premise 1 (Mood A): All birds can fly   All B are A 
Premise 2 (Mood A):  All pigeons are birds  All C are B 
Conclusion (Mood A):  All pigeons can fly   All C are A 
 The goal of this thesis is to create a computational model of this fractionated 
deductive reasoning system for solving categorical syllogisms. Accomplishing this would 
provide some evidence for such a system to be computationally feasible in the 
explanation of human performance. This is done by modelling the performance of 
neurological patients as well as healthy controls on syllogistic tasks. In simulating 
fluctuations of performance due to brain damage or belief-bias it could be argued a 
fractionated reasoning system can support deductive reasoning processes. The 
performance of patients and controls from archival VHIS data and that provided by the 
computational model will be statistically compared on a number of factors.  
Limitations with the patient data restrict the model versus data comparisons to 
control groups, frontotemporal lesion groups (heuristic system), and bilateral parietal 
lesion groups (formal system). Overall differences in accuracy and reaction time due to 
lesion group will be examined. The formal system will employ the mental models 
approach, which bears a strong prediction that single model problems will be solved 
faster and easier than multiple model problems (Johnson-Laird, 1983). This approach 
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will be provided some verification by having the computational model’s estimation of 
which problems are single or multiple model problems tested to see if this distinction 
yields significantly different accuracies and reaction times for model and human data. 
Explaining the difference between the two is difficult without explaining the process, so 
this discussion is reserved for section 4.1. 
As the formal and heuristic systems are the primary focus of this investigation, 
the effects of a conclusion’s validity being congruent or incongruent with held beliefs 
(the congruency effect) is of primary importance. As an example, the proposition ‘Some 
males are children’ would be congruent with a person’s held beliefs, while the statement 
‘All dogs can fly’ would be incongruent with belief. Belief-bias will be examined to see if 
the strength of its effect changes due to lesion grouping.  
Lastly, the wide variability of comparable individuals’ performance on categorical 
syllogisms suggests the possibility of differences in cognitive processing style, with 
some reasoners being slower and more deliberately analytical, while others’ decision-
making is more quickly decided by heuristics and biases. Previous research suggests 
that potential interaction effects of congruency with the dependent variables of accuracy 
and reaction time may be moderated by overall differences in cognitive style between 
participants (Stupple, Ball, Evans, & Kamal-Smith, 2011). Highly logical subjects are 
thought to be more likely to inhibit belief bias effects and take more time to solve belief-
logic conflict problems, especially for problem with conclusions that are believable but 
invalid. The reaction time prediction investigated by Stupple et al. (2011) will be 
investigated for the human data only, as the computational model will provide no 
implementation for differences in cognitive processing style. Programming such a 
device would demand numerous complicated assumptions beyond the scope of the 
present study.  
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1.4 What is 4CAPS 
The computational model presented in this thesis is built on top of 4CAPS and 
written in LISP – a programming language popular for use in the design of artificial 
intelligence systems. The Collaborative Activation-based Production System (CAPS) is 
designed to model high-level cognitive functions at the cortical level. It has been used 
for simulating sentence comprehension, mental rotation, and problem-solving tasks 
such as the Tower of London and the Tower of Hanoi (Just & Varma, 2007; Varma, 
2006). 4CAPS models the cortical constraints of information processing across multiple 
brain areas. It does this using a hybrid symbolic-connectionist architecture. The 
symbolic aspect is apparent in its use of production systems to represent cognitive 
processes. Production systems consist of an ‘if-then’ condition-action pair. If a collection 
of variables are storing particular values, then a number of actions will take place. A 
visual cat-detection module may have conditions that if it is furry, has a tail, and has 
pointed ears, then signal it is a cat. Working memory elements (WMEs) are used by 
4CAPS to store a list of variables to be searched through by productions. When all the 
conditions of a production are satisfied it may modify WMEs or generate new WMEs. All 
productions are fired in parallel, where one check of all productions is considered to be 
one program cycle. Production systems are excellent for performing deductive tasks, 
though on their own there is little room for variability. 
It is the connectionist aspect which provides these additional degrees of freedom. 
Individual WMEs are to be understood as a neural cluster supporting some cognitive 
representation (e.g. a word or object) which possesses its own firing rate. This activity 
level, typically varying from 0 to 1, can be increased or decreased similar to excitation 
and inhibition as a result of modification by conditionally satisfied productions. The 
spreading of activation from one WME to another (or many-to-many, etc.) will often 
have a stronger effect if the initial set of WMEs are at a higher activity level. To continue 
using the example of a cat detection module, the presence of the various cat-like 
features mentioned may have an additive excitatory effect on a cat-detector WME, while 
unlikely features being present (like having a hard shell) would fire productions that 
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inhibit this cat-detector WME. If the sum of these activations were above some minimal 
threshold, another if-then production may signal the presence of a cat (see Figure 7). 
    
 
 
 
 
Figure 7 
How these activation levels change do not depend only upon other working 
memory elements. 4CAPS is intended to model the interaction between multiple brain 
areas to facilitate cognitive functions. That being the case, the total level of activation 
within any particular center cannot exceed the cortical supply or capacity of that area. 
When this capacity is exceeded, the activation level of all WMEs will be scaled down to 
match cortical supply. Since the conditions of productions can include not just the 
content of a WMEs values – it may also require the WMEs be at some minimal 
activation level to be detected – a scaling down of activation may stop some 
productions from firing when they would have otherwise. This is how 4CAPS can 
simulate human errors, forgetting information, or a slowing down of processing under 
cases of computational overload.  
All centers of the brain in a 4CAPS system have their own activation capacity. 
This capacity can be reduced to simulate impairment by a brain lesion. This will result in 
the center having to work harder and be more likely to introduce errors. Different brain 
areas can also share computational resources in situations of high computational 
demand. However, when a different brain center is forced to take on the typical 
computations of another it may not be as efficient in its processing. WMEs can be 
organized under classes where each brain area can have its own specified degree of 
specialization for processing these classes. An area with a specialization level of 0.5 will 
consume twice the activation to perform the same activity as an area with a 1.0 
specialization level. For the sake of simplicity and the avoidance of unwarranted 
assumptions, the modules of this current computational model are functionally distinct. 
15 
 
While the areas certainly influence each other’s processing through excitation and 
inhibition, one region will not attempt to take on the functional role of another if it 
becomes overloaded. 
In summary, 4CAPS is a cognitive neuro-architecture for modelling cortical 
constraints on information processing. Its mechanisms combine deterministic production 
systems with analog activation levels. Group differences can be represented by 
variations in the processing capacities of brain areas and the effectiveness of their 
intercommunication. These differences alter the connection weights between nodes with 
the result that WMEs may fail to reach critical thresholds. This architecture allows 
4CAPS to simulate human error under cases of computational overload (Varma, 2014). 
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Methods 
2.1 Study Population 
 The human data for this thesis comes from archival data collected from male 
patients and controls as part of the Vietnam head injury study (VHIS – for more detail 
see Raymont, Salazar, Krueger, & Grafman, 2011). All patients received penetrating 
head injuries during service at Vietnam in the 1960s. To be included in the selection for 
the patient groups subjects needed to be above a minimal threshold of damage in key 
Brodmann areas (BA) identified by previous research; demonstrating a 10% proportion 
of damage in a single critical BA, or combined across the few relevant BAs for that 
system (see Appendix A). To be included in a particular functional grouping, patients 
were also required not to possess significant damage in another key functional system. 
Parietal patients, for example, could not be significantly damaged in key left-
frontotemporal regions. For patient groups requiring damage to only the left 
hemisphere, those with damage to the right hemisphere were excluded. In accordance 
with the findings of Goel et al. (2000) on neural dissociations due to familiar and 
unfamiliar content, the parietal group required damage in either or both hemispheres in 
BA 7 and BA 40 (Goel et al., 2000), while the frontal-temporal group needed to show 
damage in key left-hemisphere areas (BAs 21/22/47).  
The number of patients surviving selection for uncertainty maintenance (BAs 44/47) and 
conflict detection systems (BAs 45/46) was extremely low due to overlapping damage in 
other key areas, this was especially true for damage being present in both of these 
systems as they are close in proximity. Due to these selection difficulties, statistical 
comparisons of performance provided below was restricted to comparisons of the 
formal and heuristic systems with a primary focus on differences between congruent 
and incongruent syllogisms. Patients who did not respond to 33% or more of the 
syllogisms were also excluded. The demographics for the subject groups (see Appendix 
B) concerning age, level of education, and measures of memory and intelligence 
showed no significant differences among subject groupings. Figures 8 and 9 show 
overlay images illustrating the areas of damage for the final frontotemporal and parietal 
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groups, where lighter colored regions show areas of greater damage overlap across 
patients.  
 
 Figure 8 Bilateral Parietal Lesion Group
 
 Figure 9 Left Frontotemporal Lesion Group 
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2.2 Original Task 
In the task relevant to this study, brain damaged patients and healthy controls 
solved 19 content-free and content-imbued categorical syllogisms. While the responses 
in the content-free conditions were used in adjusting parameters of the model, the 
thesis focuses on belief-bias, and as such the subsequent analyses only concern the 
content-imbued data. Participants were instructed to determine whether or not the given 
conclusion followed logically from the two premises (i.e. if it was logically valid) with the 
assumption that the premises are true. Participants were told to press the ‘C’ key if they 
believed the conclusion to be valid, and the ‘M’ key if they thought it to be invalid. For 
each trial, the premises and conclusion were presented simultaneously, and they 
remained on screen until a response was indicated, which advanced them to the next 
syllogism. There was no limit to the amount of allowed time for a particular trial. Two 
blocks of problems were presented, one consisting of syllogisms and the other an equal 
number of operators (which are not syllogisms), where the trials within each block were 
randomized to prevent order effects. Afterwards, ratings indicating the general 
believability of the conclusions solely on the basis of their content were also collected 
on a scale from 1 (very unbelievable) to 5 (very believable). 
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Human Data 
3.1 Human Data Results 
 In an initial analysis of the data, two separate one-way ANOVAs were conducted 
to examine the basic relationship between lesion group (IV) and one of the two 
dependent variables: these variables consisted of reaction time measured in 
milliseconds, and accuracy as a proportion ranging from zero to one. The arcsine 
transformation [arcsine(√x)] was applied to all accuracy data in this study; this 
transformation is one method for addressing the problems associated with proportions 
over count based data, particularly those where values may fall below 0.3 or above 0.7. 
Where such extreme values may occur, in a variable bounded between zero and one, 
problems may emerge such as in the interpretation of confidence intervals, which may 
extend beyond this range and become meaningless. This transformation pulls out the 
ends of the distribution and provides a new range of π; it also provides correction for the 
occasionally observed departures from homogeneity of variance in the untransformed 
accuracy data. Key statistics such as F ratios or their associated p-values are derived 
from transformed variables, though graphs and descriptive statistics such as means or 
standard errors are expressed in untransformed terms for ease of interpretation. 
 The preliminary one-way ANOVA tests investigated the effect of membership to a 
lesion group on performance. Lesion group was divided into three levels: the control 
group, those with bilateral parietal lobe lesions, and those with left frontotemporal 
lesions. These one-way ANOVAs were performed on all syllogisms- across congruence 
for content-imbued syllogisms. The accuracies of subjects did not differ significantly due 
to lesion group, F(2, 69) = 0.59, p = .56. The effect of group membership on reaction 
time was marginally significant, F(2, 69) = 2.67, p = .077, ηp2 = .07. This effect showed 
a trend of increased reaction time for the frontotemporal lesion group (M = 24904, SE = 
2033) compared to the control group (M = 19658, SE = 1206).  
The results of the initial task by group analyses are graphically summarized by 
figures 10 and 11 using untransformed values. Other known factors may obscure 
differences, such as variation in a syllogism’s representational complexity, and the 
effects of congruence (or incongruence) between belief and a syllogism’s deductive 
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validity. Therefore, despite limited results at a coarse level of analysis, differences due 
to lesion group are probed further. 
 Figure 10
 Figure 11     
 Two-factor 2x3 repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted; this consisted of a 
between-subjects IV of lesion group with the same three levels, and a within-subjects 
factor of model complexity. Model complexity consisted of two levels, single or multiple 
modelling, where single model problems can typically be solved from an immediate 
evaluation of the premises, and multiple model problems typically require representation 
of a number of alternate situations to properly evaluate a conclusion’s deductive validity. 
Determining whether a problem was a single or multiple model problem was decided by 
the computational model’s representational output for the task syllogisms.  
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 The first two-factor ANOVA, for the dependent variable of accuracy, 
demonstrated a significant main effect of model complexity on problem accuracy, F(1, 
69) = 45.21, p < .001, ηp2 = .40. Humans were more accurate with single-model 
problems (M = .78, SE = .01), than for multiple-model problems (M = .63, SE = .02). The 
second two-factor ANOVA, conducted for the dependent variable of reaction time, also 
showed a significant main effect of model complexity on reaction time, F(1, 69) = 8.57, p 
= .005, ηp2 = .11. Humans took less time to solve single-model problems (M = 21072, 
SE = 962), than they needed to solve multiple-model problems (M = 23219, SE = 1150).  
 Figure 12
 Figure 13     
 The next set of analyses investigated the relationship between congruency (IV) 
and lesion group (IV), on accuracy and reaction time (DVs) in two sets of 2x3 two-factor 
repeated measures ANOVAs. For the two levels of congruency, congruent and 
incongruent syllogisms, a problem is congruent in one of two cases: if the conclusion is 
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believable and deductively valid, or the conclusion is unbelievable and deductively 
invalid. On the contrary, a problem is incongruent when the believability of the 
conclusion and its deductive validity are in disagreement. 
 The first 2x3 two-factor repeated measures ANOVA investigates the DV of 
accuracy. A significant main effect of congruency on problem accuracy was observed, 
F(1, 69) = 86.96, p < .001, ηp2 = .56. Subjects demonstrated higher accuracy levels with 
congruent syllogisms (M = .85, SE = .02) than with incongruent syllogisms (M = .61, SE 
= .03). A significant interaction between congruency and group on accuracy was 
observed, F(2, 69) = 3.23, p = .046. Finding the source of this interaction was difficult, 
so post-hoc analysis using the LSD test was used to find the group differences most 
likely to account for the interaction. The frontotemporal group showed the strongest 
differences for the congruent condition, displaying mean accuracies which trended 
lower than the parietal lesion group (p = .18), and the control group (p = .094). The 
frontotemporal group appears to be impaired on congruent syllogisms (M = .80, SE 
= .03) compared to the control group (M = .87, SE = .02), and the parietal lesion group 
(M = .89, SE = .03). For the incongruent condition, the parietal lesion group (M = .54, 
SE = .05) showed a trend of impaired performance compared to frontotemporal group 
(M = .65, SE = .05, p = .15), and the control group (M = .62, SE = .04, p = .18) in terms 
of accuracy. Figure 14 provides a depiction of this interaction for the human data. 
  Figure 14 
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 The second two-factor repeated measures ANOVA, utilizing the DV of reaction 
time, displayed a significant main effect of congruency on reaction time, F(1, 69) = 
19.75, p < .001, ηp2 = .22. Belief-congruent syllogisms were solved faster (M = 20115, 
SE = 1004) than belief-incongruent syllogisms (M = 23429, SE = 1080). No significant 
interaction was found between congruency and lesion group for the DV of reaction time, 
F(2, 69) = 1.07, p = .349. 
 Figure 15
 Figure 16 
 The final set of ANOVAs are defined by a finer breakdown of the congruency 
factor, which consists of a relationship between conclusion believability and its 
deductive validity. These 2x2x3 three-factor repeated measures ANOVAs consist of the 
within-subject IVs of believability (believable/unbelievable), validity (valid/invalid), and 
the same between-subject IV of lesion group. Unfortunately, separation of groups at 
such a fine grain resulted in a failure to satisfy the assumption of homogeneity of 
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variance for reaction time data. For the human data, the invalid-believable group had a 
significant result for Levene’s test (F(2, 69) = 3.48, p = .036). After using the log10(√x) 
transformation, this unfortunate significant result disappeared (F(2, 69) = 1.79, p = .17).  
 The three-way ANOVA for human data concerning the DV of accuracy showed 
significant main effects for believability F(1, 69) = 32.26, p < .001, ηp2 = .32, and for 
validity F(1, 69) = 8.53, p = .005, ηp2 = .11. Humans were more accurate with 
unbelievable syllogisms (M = .80, SE = .02) than believable syllogisms (M = .68, SE 
= .02). Humans were also more accurate with valid problems (M = .78, SE = .03) than 
they were for invalid problems (M = .69, SE = .02). A strong interaction between 
believability and validity was present, F(2, 69) = 64.88, p < .001, ηp2 = .49, though as 
this essentially represents the congruency effect investigated previously, it warrants no 
further attention. 
The identical format ANOVA investigating the DV of reaction time for human data 
showed a significant main effect of validity on reaction time, F(1, 69) = 6.39, p = .014, 
ηp2 = .09. Deductively valid problems are solved faster (M = 20388, SE = 1072) than 
invalid problems (M = 22756, SE = 1072). A significant interaction between believability 
and validity on reaction time is observed, F(1, 69) = 19.42, p < .001, ηp2 = .22. This 
known effect (Stupple et al., 2011) is the result of incongruent syllogisms which are 
believable but invalid taking significantly more time to process than any other type (see 
Figure 17). 
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 To investigate these reaction time differences further, the human data was 
probed in a manner similar to the study by Stupple et al. (2011), whom investigated the 
relationship between believability and validity on reaction time by dividing patients 
according to high and low logical ability. A similar index was formed by measuring the 
difference between an individual’s acceptance of valid and invalid conclusions. Unlike in 
the previous study, two groups (high and low logic) were formed rather than three; this 
was done due to the fact that the present subject pool (71) is much smaller than the 130 
used by Stupple et al. (2011). Ten subjects located in the exact center of the logic index 
were discarded, leaving 32 subjects in the high-logic condition, and 30 subjects in the 
low-logic condition. 
   A three-factor 2x2x2 mixed design ANOVA was conducted to examine the 
relationship between logic-group, believability, and validity. A comparative lack of power 
failed to produce significant interactions involving group, though the main effect of group 
was marginally significant (F(1, 60) = 2.69, p = .11, ηp2 = .04); the trend showed the 
high-logic group to take more time solving syllogisms (M = 22040, SE = 1391), than the 
low-logic group (M = 18760, SE = 1437). As particular interest is placed on believable-
invalid syllogisms, a simple independent samples t-test was produced to probe this 
difference, which was found to be significant, F(60) = 3.71, p = .020, d = .61. The high-
logic group spent significantly more time solving believable-invalid syllogisms (M = 
26427, SE = 1795), than spent by the low-logic group (M = 20278, SE = 1854). 
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3.2 Human Results Discussion 
 The results of the human data is generally in line with previously discussed 
neuroimaging data and scientific literature on deductive reasoning. At the broad level of 
analysis, task by lesion group, the frontotemporal lesion group showed the largest 
increases in reaction time. This makes sense considering that, by impairing the network 
supporting belief-based responding, this makes early termination of problem-solving 
more difficult, and increases the demand for more time-consuming formal procedures. 
The frontotemporal lesion group also demonstrates some overlapping damage into 
more general left prefrontal cortex areas thought to support general reasoning abilities 
(Goel et al., 2006). All subject groups responded as predicted by literature supporting a 
mental models approach to formal reasoning (Bucciarelli & Johnson-Laird, 1999) such 
that single model problems were solved faster and with greater accuracy than multiple 
model problems. 
  The congruency effect on logical reasoning, well-known in reasoning literature 
(Evans, Barston, Pollard, 1983), was confirmed across all groups in a broad manner; 
syllogisms with conclusions whose deductive validity matches the beliefs of the subjects 
are solved with greater accuracy and speed than those demonstrating incongruence. 
Further, the results importantly justified the neuroanatomical distinctions drawn by Goel 
(2009) when accuracy effects were broken down by group. Belief-bias facilitates correct 
responding in the congruent condition, and the frontotemporal lesion group, employing a 
network thought to be important to these content effects, showed lower accuracies than 
control or bilateral parietal patient groups. Incongruent problems are thought to rely on 
formal reasoning processes, supported by the bilateral parietal network, intervening with 
belief-biased processes. Human data seems to support this neuroanatomical distinction 
as the bilateral parietal group displayed lower problem accuracies than control or 
frontotemporal lesion groups. 
 The interactions between believability and validity in the human data also 
conform to reasoning literature. Studies have found humans to be more successful at 
engaging logical reasoning for syllogisms with unbelievable conclusions than believable 
ones (Evans et al., 1983; Klauer, Musch, & Naumer, 2000; Stupple & Ball, 2011). An 
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implication of this is such that believable-invalid problems are particularly difficult, and 
consume the most time to complete. These theoretical suggestions agree with the 
results of the present human data. The final interesting result in the human data agrees 
with research by Stupple and Ball (2011) suggesting that the most logical responders 
(the best performers) take exceptionally longer time to solve believable-invalid problems 
than the lower performers who are much more apt to quickly solve the problem through 
incorrect belief-biased responding. 
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The Computational Model 
4.1 Model design 
 Prior to discussing the results of the modelling data, it is necessary to explain the 
computational model in depth; including how it operates and what known cognitive 
biases it attempts to implement. Performance data from VHIS control subjects dealing 
with syllogisms that contained meaningful content and content-free forms were used for 
the initial design and calibration of the computational model. The content condition 
guided the implementation of the heuristic system’s belief-bias effect, while the content-
free condition played a greater role in the design and calibration of the effects of other 
prominent cognitive biases in categorical syllogism literature. Beyond this point, 
adjustments were made for the implementation of lesions to allow the model’s 
performance to be measured against human controls and patients. This enables one 
potential framework of a fractionated deductive reasoning system to be empirically 
tested. 
 There are five main components in the computational model. The general pattern 
completer (left PFC) breaks down and distributes the propositions of the categorical 
syllogism to the heuristic and formal reasoning systems. It receives feedback from 
various centers and completes the patterns of information in these signals to arrive at a 
validity judgement. The formal system (bi-lateral parietal network) evaluates the 
syllogism in accordance with mental model theory. The heuristic system (left 
frontal/temporal) influences decision-making through the belief-bias effect. The conflict 
detector monitors these two processing networks for logical conflict and belief-logic 
conflict. The uncertainty maintenance system attempts to inhibit belief-bias during 
complicated logical representations, though its ability to do so is impaired under 
situations of strong belief.  
 The general pattern completer starts by identifying the syntactic role of the 
components of the premises. These include quantifiers (all/no/some) copular terms 
(are/is/have/can/etc.) and the negation ‘not’. The original full sentences are broken 
down and a new WME has its variables filled with these relevant syntactic elements. At 
this point a check is performed to see if a premise conversion error is performed (based 
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upon elements to be discussed later) – involving a switch of the two terms in a particular 
premise (or conclusion). Following this, the pattern completer simultaneously passes 
the syllogism on to the formal and heuristic systems for evaluation. The pattern 
completer will receive feedback from the other parts of the deductive reasoning system 
as it attempts to reach a decision about the validity of the conclusion. To arrive at a 
decision, the activation level of two WMEs, representing a valid or invalid choice, will 
increase until it exceeds some critical firing rate threshold in a first-past-the-post 
decision-making paradigm.  
 The heuristic system primarily provides a mechanism for belief bias, which has 
shown a highly robust effect on the processing of syllogisms (Evans, Barston, & Pollard, 
1983). For this effect, performance on syllogisms is improved when the conclusion is 
consistent with the beliefs of the subject compared to when it is inconsistent. The 
conclusion ‘all men are smokers’ is an example of a conclusion incongruent with human 
beliefs, while the conclusion ‘some mushrooms are not poisonous’ would be congruent 
with human beliefs. The computational model introduces this effect by increasing the 
pattern completer’s validity judgement (valid/invalid) WME activation depending upon 
the belief held and the strength to which it is held. As previous research indicates 
believable conclusions provoke stronger levels of belief-bias than for unbelievable 
conclusions (Evans et al., 1983), believable conclusions have a stronger influence over 
the pattern completer’s valid signal than unbelievable conclusions do over the invalid 
signal.  
The rates with which the model believes a particular conclusion to be true or 
false are set by conclusion endorsement rates gathered from the controls in the 
Vietnam Head Injury study. The strength and direction of the belief is randomly 
generated from the proportion of responses indicating a particular belief rating; if 10% of 
responses indicated strong disbelief in the conclusion (rating of 1), then there is a 10% 
chance the belief generated will be strong disbelief. A valid belief increases the pattern 
completer’s decision-valid WME activation level, and an invalid one increases the 
decision-invalid activation level, where a stronger belief (or disbelief) will introduce a 
stronger activation boost. This change also depends upon the health of the heuristic 
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system, for if it is lesioned it will have less of an influence over the pattern completer’s 
decision signals. 
 The formal system is the most computationally intense aspect of the program. It 
generates evaluations of categorical syllogisms in accordance with mental model 
theory. Mental model theory (Johnson-Laird, 1983) suggests the relationships between 
the terms of categorical syllogisms are represented by a finite set of mental tokens. 
These tokens are arranged to represent the two premises and integrated to form an 
initial model of the situation. Reasoners will attempt to derive conclusions from this 
model, following this, they may or may not perform a number of manipulations to the 
model to search for counterexamples and refute these conclusions. The data used for 
this thesis involves syllogisms where the subject is provided conclusions, rather than 
asked to generate their own from the premises as is done in the computational model 
explained by Bucciarelli and Johnson-Laird (1999). While this required some departures 
in the evaluation of models and the search for alternate models, the overall process is 
highly similar. The original mental model program would not generate negative 
conclusion for premises lacking negations; therefore if a negative conclusion is provided 
for such a set of premises, the program is forced to proceed with operations it would 
use as if negative tokens were present in order to falsify such a conclusion. 
 The four possible syllogistic moods are represented by four mental models (see 
Figure 18). Square brackets are used to show that the token has been exhaustively 
represented, as is the case with the two universal moods, where we have a full account 
of this token so that no more instances of it will be added to the model in the search for 
alternatives. Before we can combine premises the models must be arranged so that the 
middle terms line up. As mentioned previously, there are four different figures for 
categorical syllogisms which represent the different orders in which the terms may 
occur. For the first figure (see Figure 19) the middle term (B) is already in the middle, so 
no change is necessary. For the second figure the order of the premises is switched. 
The third and fourth figure require that the terms are swapped in the second premise 
and in the first premise, respectively before integration can occur. An inspection-time 
analysis (Espino, Santamaria, & Garcia-Madruga, 2000) indicates that this additional 
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effort, for figures other than the first, slightly increases the time it takes to integrate the 
premises, but has no effect on the accuracy of subjects in solving syllogisms. 
 Figure 18 
[X] Y  [X] -Y  X Y  X -Y  
[X] Y  [X] -Y  X   X -Y 
 Y   Y   Y   Y    
    Y      Y 
All X are Y  No X are Y  Some X are Y Some X are not Y 
universal  universal  particular  particular 
affirmative  negative  affirmative  negative 
 Figure 19 
First Figure  Second Figure Third Figure  Fourth Figure 
A B  B A  A B  B A  
B C  C B  C B  B C 
 To unite the two models, we find the middle terms for both models and move the 
end-term attached to the middle term in the second model so that it is now beside the 
middle term in the first model. If during this move the middle term is exhausted in either 
model it becomes exhausted in the integrated model. Once all of these moves are 
completed any remaining free tokens are appended to the end of the integrated model 
(see Figure 20).  
 Figure 20 
Premise 1  Premise 2    
Some A are B All B are C   Integrated model 
A B  [B] C   A [B] C 
A   [B] C   A 
 B       [B] C 
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 To evaluate this integrated model the end tokens are read bi-directionally, from 
left to right and from right to left, to see if a particular conclusion holds true across all 
lines. If the conclusion to be tested here was that ‘Some A are not C’ this would appear 
to be true as in the second line we have an A but no C. To see if that can be falsified 
additional models are created. For positive models (ones lacking negatives no/not in the 
premises or conclusion) model creation functions add-affirmative, move, and break may 
be executed. For add-affirmative, new lines can be created containing end tokens that 
are not exhaustively represented. Move will move ‘free end-tokens’ into empty spaces. 
Break will divides a line with unexhausted middle terms into two lines. For negative 
models (which have a negation in a premise or conclusion) also utilize the move and 
break operations, though their method for adding tokens is different, here non-
exhausted tokens are added to empty spaces to falsify conclusions (see Figure 21). 
These new models will be tested and the process repeated until an invalid case is 
found, or the general pattern completer arrives at a validity judgement. Figure 22 
provides a flow diagram of the mental model procedure, where dashed-line arrows to 
output represent stages of tentative output to the general pattern completer regarding 
the likely validity of the tested conclusion. 
 Figure 21 
ADD operation     MOVE operation 
A [B] C     A [B] -C   
A   Add C (add-negative)  A    2) move here 
 [B] C      [B] -C 
   Add C (add-affirmative)    [C] 
BREAK operation       [C]  1) move token  
A B C    A B 
       B C 
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Figure 22 
The deductive validity of a single-model problem will be immediately obvious 
after the integration of the information of both premises. For multiple model problems, 
the appropriate deductive decision is ambiguous at this step, and requires the 
formulation of additional potential scenarios to determine the validity of the conclusion.  
If we use a previous example syllogism, 
Premise 1 All birds can fly   All B are A  Premise 1 Premise 2 
Premise 2 All pigeons are birds  All C are B  [B] A [C] B 
Conclusion: All pigeons can fly  All C are A  [B] A [C] B 
 upon integrating the models of these two premises we arrive the following model: 
[C] [B] A 
[C] [B] A 
When we evaluate the conclusion “All C are A” we see C to be exhaustively 
represented, and it always has an A on the other side of its line, confirming this 
conclusion to be deductively valid. If we instead turn to a multiple-model syllogism, 
         Premise 1 Premise 2 
Premise 1 No coffee contains nicotine No A are B  [A] -B [B] -C 
Premise 2 No nicotine contains tea No B are C  [A] -B [B] -C 
Conclusion: No tea contains coffee No C are A   B  C 
          B  C 
then this is the resultant integrated model: 
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[A] -B 
[A] -B 
 [B] -C 
 [B] -C 
  C 
  C  
If we try to observe whether “No C are A” is valid, we are unsure, as the only instances 
of C have no token at the other end after integration. It is a possible case that no C 
come with A due to this blank space, but we are not sure if there are other possible 
cases where this is false. To be deductively valid, there must be no cases where C can 
be followed by A. To confirm or disconfirm this conclusion we must tweak this model. By 
moving the C token up into the blank spaces above it (see below), we create an 
alternate scenario where “No C are A” is false, demonstrating this conclusion to be 
deductively invalid. For a multiple model problem, the initial integrated model may 
suggest a conclusion to be valid, but there remains uncertainty regarding other 
possibilities. This is why these problems should take longer, and are more difficult to 
accurately solve. 
[A] -B C 
[A] -B C 
 [B] -C 
 [B] -C 
The formal system will provide its first indications to the pattern completer 
concerning potential judgments at the conclusion evaluation stage. A seemingly valid 
conclusion will result in a mild boost of decision-valid activation levels. An invalid 
conclusion will impose a strong change in activation, though it is often not enough on its 
own to completely and immediately determine the pattern completer’s decision. If the 
conflict detection system is not heavily taxed this invalid signal will be more powerful, 
and it will be repeated until the pattern completer arrives at a final decision and signals 
other systems to cease operations. A valid conclusion will necessitate the construction 
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of additional models (if possible) and a continuation of this process until a final validity 
decision is reached. 
The conflict detection system consumes activation when the formal reasoning 
system is checking for logical inconsistencies. This system ‘works harder’ and 
consumes more activation depending upon the number of lines the current model takes 
to represent. Universal affirmative moods (All X are Y) are the easiest to represent, 
while models containing negative premises are more complicated – they typically 
require more lines in their representation. Thus, different combinations of premises 
induce different levels of strain on conflict detection; and having to monitor for 
consistency with belief adds even more burden. The greater the burden on the system, 
the weaker the effect the formal system has in identifying an invalid conclusion to the 
general pattern completer. When an invalid conclusion is not picked up, the formal 
system may continue to attempt to derive additional models after an invalid case has 
been generated. These new derivations may either change the logical interpretation of 
the syllogism, or they may simply delay finding the correct solution long enough for 
belief-bias to induce the wrong decision for incongruent problems. Higher levels of 
strain on the conflict detection system also decreases the inhibition this system is able 
to apply to the heuristic system to reduce belief-bias effects when there is a conflict 
between logic and belief.  
 The uncertainty maintenance system alerts the general pattern completer of 
indeterminate or ambiguous situations. It activates or refreshes its activation during the 
creation of alternate models, which are taken to represent more ambiguous situations. 
In these cases, the uncertainty maintenance system will also inhibit the belief bias 
response. When belief levels are at their strongest (5 or 1) it is hypothesized in the 
current model that there is less uncertainty in the situation due to these particularly 
potent beliefs. To represent this, the heuristic system will also have inhibitory 
connections onto the uncertainty maintenance system. Its inhibition will be stronger 
when the beliefs are stronger, and weaker if the heuristic system is lesioned.  
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5.2 Cognitive Biases 
 Beyond the functional division (and interaction) of processing among the 5 brain-
based modules, the computational model also incorporates functions for introducing a 
number of well-known cognitive biases in the literature concerning the categorical 
syllogism. These biases include the atmosphere effect, matching bias, and premise 
conversion errors. The effects of these biases in the system were primarily configured 
using the content-free data, as without the belief-bias effect from content these 
additional biases remain as the primary sources of error. The biases take their effect by 
influencing the general pattern completer’s judgement decision, or by transforming the 
implications of the premises prior to being passed on from the pattern completer.  
The atmosphere effect (Woodworth & Sells, 1935) is an example of an inductive 
or probabilistic reasoning process where the presence of negative items – as found in 
the propositions ‘No X are Y’ or ‘Some X are not Y’ – or the presence of the particular 
quantifier some in the premises of a syllogism have implications for the likelihood of a 
conclusion being valid. Associative heuristics may be employed where if at least one 
premise is negative the conclusion is more likely to be negative, and if at least one 
premise is particular the conclusion is more likely to be particular.  
If one of these matches exist between the moods of the premises and 
conclusion, the model acts on this by having the general pattern completer raise the 
activation level of the conclusion-valid WME. If there is a negative or particular premise 
(or both) and the conclusion does not match, the activation of the conclusion-invalid 
WME increases. The increase is even greater for valid (or invalid) WMEs if both 
conditions are (un-)satisfied. Another logical extension of this relationship is that if 
neither premise is negative the conclusion should be affirmative (‘All X are Y’ or ‘Some 
X are Y’), and if neither premise is particular the conclusion should be universal (‘All X 
are Y’ or ‘No X are Y’). Bucciarelli and Laird (1999) have an alternative explanation of 
the atmosphere effect using mental model theory. It is stated that conclusions derived 
from an initial model of the premises will also match the mood of at least one premise, 
similar to a superficial matching of verbal forms. In an effort to appeal to both 
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interpretations, judgements concerning the validity of a conclusion as derived from the 
initial model will have stronger weight than those of subsequent models. 
The matching bias is similar to the atmosphere effect as it involves heuristics 
operating on the quantifiers of the syllogism. Wetherick (1989) suggests that when the 
validity of a situation is not immediately obvious (suggesting its deployment in multiple 
model problems) additional heuristics may provide estimates of validity. When all 
premises are the same it suggests conclusions identical to the atmosphere effect. When 
they are different, the matching bias is said to prefer conclusions that match the more 
conservative premise (Wetherick & Golhooly, 1990). When one premise contains the 
quantifier ‘All’, matching bias selects the form of the other premise. When one premise 
is of the form ‘Some X are Y’, and the other is of the form ‘No X are Y’, matching prefers 
a ‘No X are Y’ conclusion. If a match is found, the general pattern completer’s 
conclusion-valid WME activation increases. 
 The remaining cognitive biases involve a misrepresentation of the information 
provided by the premises prior to creating a formal model of the situation. Faulty logical 
implications (Rips, 1994) arise from a common-sense (mis-)understanding of the 
premises based upon communicative norms. The premise ‘Some X are Y’ is taken to 
imply that there are also some X which are not Y, because if this was not the case it is 
assumed the stronger premise ‘All X are Y’ would be provided instead. Similarly, ‘Some 
X are not Y’ is taken to imply there are also some X which are Y, as otherwise the 
premise ‘No X are Y’ would be present. Inferring more information from premises than 
they actually present, in accordance with logical norms, leads reasoners to build faulty 
initial models of situations that lend themselves to faulty conclusions. 
Faulty implications are said to be, in part, based upon communicative norms 
because a speaker generally would not provide the weaker relationship between two 
terms if a stronger one were true. However, the premises of syllogisms present 
relationship-knowledge assumed to be true rather than what might be actually true. In 
certain cases where a faulty implication makes strong intuitive sense, the likelihood of 
these conversions increase. For example, if one premise states that ‘some Olympic 
athletes are smokers’, the likelihood of this also implying ‘some Olympic athletes are not 
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smokers’ is even greater than when presented in an abstract token form. Information on 
the believability of premises was not collected, let alone information concerning the 
believability of alternate forms of premises, so this is an assumption of the model 
estimated to improve its fit with data by increasing the potential for error. Implementing 
this change within mental models is relatively easy, as it basically involves adding 
positive or negative tokens to the premise models depending on the additional 
implication applied. 
  The final bias to be implemented are conversion errors (Chapman & Chapman, 
1959). In this type of error, the terms of a premise are switched, causing the reasoner to 
incorrectly infer the inverse of a proposition. All X are Y is taken to imply All Y are X, 
and Some X are not Y is taken to mean Some Y are not X. In the former situation, we 
do not have any information about what logically follows given Y; we only know what is 
true when given X. In the latter situation, while Some X are not Y, it is possible that in all 
the cases where X leads to Y that these are all the instances where Y occurs; this 
means that the inverse (Some Y are not X) is incorrect as instead ‘All Y are X’ is true. 
Conversion errors are implemented relatively easily by the pattern completer sometimes 
accidentally switching the terms before passing the information elsewhere. As with the 
faulty implications bias, the rate of this occurring increases if the inverse of a proposition 
is more intuitively appealing in content conditions, which again is an assumption of the 
model. 
 To generate data for statistical comparison of model performance against human 
performance, sets of thirty simulated subjects were generated for the various lesion 
groups. This number was chosen so that it would not be so high as to make every result 
significant by artificially inflating the degrees of freedom. The groups were large enough 
so that these equal samples would be more robust against violations of heterogeneity of 
variance. Lesions were applied to the formal and heuristic systems by approximately 
halving the activation capacity of these centers. Accuracy and reaction time data was 
organized for simulated subjects under a number of different categories. These 
categories included distinctions between single and multiple models, congruent and 
incongruent problems, and all combinations of believability and validity: believable-valid, 
believable-invalid, unbelievable-valid, and unbelievable-invalid.  
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5.3 Model Data Results 
Two separate one-way ANOVAs were conducted to examine the basic 
relationship between lesion group (IV) and the dependent variables of reaction time and 
accuracy on model performance. There was no significant main effect of lesion group 
on accuracy, F(2, 87) = 2.10, p = .129. The effect of lesion group on reaction time for 
the computational model was significant, F(2, 87) = 29.59, p < .001, ηp2 = .41.  Post-hoc 
analysis using the Sidak correction showed the simulated control group to perform 
faster than other lesion groups (all p < .001).  
  Figure 23 
 Figure 24 
 Two-factor 2x3 repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted on model data for 
accuracy and reaction time DVs; this consisted of a between-subjects IV of lesion group 
with the same three levels, and a within-subjects factor of model complexity (single or 
multiple models). Accuracy significantly differed depending upon model complexity, F(1, 
87) = 196.84, p < .001, ηp2 = .69; single-model problems generated higher accuracy 
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scores (M = .83, SE = .009), than multiple-model problems (M = .56, SE = .016). 
Reaction time significantly differed depending upon model complexity, F(1, 87) = 67.81, 
p < .001, ηp2 = .44; single-model problems took less time to solve, (M = 19455, SE = 
67.96) than multiple-model problems (M = 21349, SE = 1150.49).  
 Figure 25
 Figure 26 
The next set of analyses investigated the relationship between congruency (IV) 
and lesion group (IV), on accuracy and reaction time (DVs) in two sets of 2x3 two-factor 
repeated measures ANOVAs. The model data investigation of accuracy demonstrated a 
significant effect of congruency on problem accuracy, F(1, 87) = 343.08, p < .001, ηp2 
= .80. Higher accuracy levels are generated for congruent syllogisms (M = .90, SE 
= .01), than for incongruent syllogisms (M = .55, SE = .01). A significant interaction 
between congruency and group on problem accuracy is again observed, (F(2, 87) = 
10.94, p < .001, ηp2 = .20). A stronger interaction effect and increased power allowed 
for tighter control over error rate than the human data when performing a post-hoc 
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analysis. The conservative Bonferroni correction showed the frontotemporal group to be 
significantly impaired (p = .01) on congruent syllogisms (M = .87, SE = .02), compared 
to the parietal lesion group (M = .93, SE = .02). The same correction applied to the 
incongruent condition showed the parietal group (M = .46, SE = .03) to be impaired 
compared to the frontotemporal group (M = .60, SE = .03, p = .002), and the control 
group (M = .60, SE = .03, p = .001). Figure 27 provides a visual representation of this 
interaction for the computational model. 
 Figure 27 
 A two-factor repeated measures ANOVA investigating the DV of reaction time 
shows a significant main effect of congruency on reaction time, F(1, 87) = 60.46, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .41. Congruent syllogisms are solved significantly faster (M = 19484, SE = 
132.67), than incongruent syllogisms (M =20955, SE = 125.98). A significant interaction 
between congruency and group on reaction time (F(2, 87) = 4.64, p = .012, ηp2 = .10) is 
found only for the computational model. This result reflects the reaction time increase, 
moving from the congruent to the incongruent condition, being sharper for the parietal 
lesion group than other groups. Figures 28 and 29 summaries the general effects of 
congruency for this section of the data analysis. 
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 Figure 28
 Figure 29 
The three-way ANOVA investigating the relationship between believability, 
validity, and group on the DV of accuracy for the model showed a significant main effect 
of believability on accuracy, F(1, 87) = 94.66, p < .001, ηp2 = .52. Simulated reasoners 
are more accurate with unbelievable problems (M = 0.84, SE = 0.01) than they are with 
believable problems (M = 0.67, SE = 0.01). Unlike for the human data, the main effect of 
validity was not significant: F(1, 87) = 0.40, p = .53, ηp2 = .01. A significant interaction 
between believability and validity on problem accuracy, again representing the 
congruency effect, was found: F(1, 87) = 239.82, p < .001, ηp2 = .73.  
 Prior to analyzing the reaction time results, the RT values for the model data 
were transformed using the log10(√x) transformation. This is in part motivated by the 
fact that the model violated Levene’s test for homogeneity of variance for the invalid-
unbelievable grouping, F(2, 87) = 6.19, p = .003. While this transformation may not 
typically be necessary as the model data is more robust to violations of homogeneity, 
due to having a larger sample with equal numbers of subjects in each group, because 
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the human data for this variable was transformed it seemed appropriate to do this for 
the model data as well.  
The three-way ANOVA analysing the DV of reaction time for the model data 
shows differences in its effects compared to the significant effects of the human data. 
While no significant reaction time difference was found between problems with 
believable and unbelievable conclusions in the human data (p = .97), for the 
computational model unbelievable problems take slightly longer (M = 21116, SE = 
124.27) than believable ones (M = 19836, SE = 130.30), demonstrating an F ratio of 
F(1, 87) = 45.54, p < .001, ηp2 = .34. Furthermore, while invalid problems took 
significantly longer for the human data (p = .003), valid problems showed slightly 
increased reaction times (M = 20924, SE = 138.41) compared to invalid problems (M 
=20028, SE = 100.65). The difference in means is extremely small, and only finds 
significance (F(1, 87) = 18.94, p < .001, ηp2 = .179) in the fact that standard errors for 
model reaction time are exceptionally low. The differences between human and model 
data on reaction time, for these factors, are largely captured by the significant 
interaction between believability and validity on reaction time. While the significant 
difference for the human data (p < .001) was accounted for by believable-invalid 
problems taking the longest amount of time, the significant interaction for model data 
(F(1, 87) = 120.15, p < .001, ηp2 = .58) is the result of believable-invalid incongruent 
syllogisms taking the most time. This systemic difference in reaction time is of interest 
for future model building efforts. 
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 Figure 30   
 To directly compare the performance of the computational model to that of the 
human subjects, the Pearson correlation is used to compare accuracy and reaction time 
values across the nineteen syllogisms utilized (see Appendix C for a list of the 
syllogisms). Highly significant values were obtained for all correlations of accuracy 
comparing human and model data: the control groups (r(19) = .88, p < .001), the 
frontotemporal group (r(19) = .72, p < .001), and bilateral parietal group (r(19) = .75, p 
< .001) were all significantly correlated. For reaction time, due to the wide variance 
present in the human data not being reflected in the model data the correlations were 
much weaker. This is particularly true for the control group r(19) = .01, p = .98, even 
though their overall means were highly similar (for humans M = 19516, SD = 3927; for 
the model M = 19433, SD = 1751). The comparisons of the parietal groups were more 
promising (r(19) = .31, p = .19), and the correlations between the frontotemporal groups 
was significant: r(19) = .41, p = .08. Graphs depicting the fit for accuracy and reaction 
time for each syllogism used are provided in Appendix D. 
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5.4 Model Results Discussion 
 Results of the modelling data largely agree with human subject data, where the 
departures that are observed have reasonable explanations. The coarse task by group 
analysis showed no significant accuracy differences for either the human or the model 
data depending upon lesion group. In terms of reaction time, the human data displayed 
a trend of increase (p = .077) in reaction time for the frontotemporal group compared to 
the control group. For the model data, the control group performed significantly faster 
than both of the lesion groups. The frontotemporal group for the human data may be 
impacted slightly more in its processing time as it is noted the left prefrontal cortex, 
correlated with general reasoning ability, possesses some overlapping lesions for which 
no equivalent general impairment is employed in the computational model. On top of 
this, the computational model employs lesions by halving the processing capacity of 
brain areas, which is possibly more dramatic than the human impairments, though it is 
necessary to provide meaningful differences in a more deterministic and less variable 
computational system. 
 Significant reduction in accuracy and reaction time for the computational model 
when dealing with multiple models as opposed to single models is replicates the effects 
found in human data. The main effects of congruency on these DVs are also the same; 
where congruent problems are easier and solved faster than incongruent problems. The 
interaction between lesion group and congruency for the dependent variable of 
accuracy also agrees with the human data; frontotemporal lesions impair the model on 
congruent syllogisms and bilateral parietal lesions impair the model on incongruent 
syllogisms.  
Aside from the main effects, congruency by lesion group interactions were 
insignificant for the human reaction time data. The model displayed one additional result 
where the bilateral parietal lesion group was more sharply impaired in terms of reaction 
time than was seen in the human data. This is explainable for much the same reasons 
as the differences in reaction time between humans and the model in the coarse task by 
group analysis; namely, a more strongly impaired deterministic system with less 
variability (low standard error) compared to human performance. 
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 For the last set of analyses, breaking down congruency into an examination of 
interactions between believability and validity, results are again highly similar (with 
some systematic differences). Both the model and human data showed unbelievable 
problems to be solved more successfully than believable problems. The key difference 
between human and model data lies in the interaction between believability and validity 
for reaction time data. For human data, believable-invalid problems consumed the most 
time, while for the model data unbelievable-valid problems took the longest to solve. 
Stupple et al. (2011) highlight the fact that the most logical reasoners spend large 
amounts of time on believable-valid problems. The computational model did not employ 
any differences in cognitive style as it utilized a single operation profile that was 
adjusted by introducing lesions. Future modelling efforts could attempt to include 
simulated high-logic individuals who respond differently to believable-invalid problems, 
and therefore bring results more in line with human data. 
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Discussion 
6.1 Results Discussion 
 We now summarize the most pertinent results of the project. The most direct 
evidence supporting a fractionated deductive reasoning system, and the only piece 
which ties a kind of functioning (heuristic or formal) to a specific brain area, comes from 
the significant interaction (p = .046) of congruency and group in terms of accuracy in 
solving categorical syllogisms for human data. Those with frontotemporal lesions, an 
area associated with belief-biased responding, were impaired on congruent syllogisms 
where belief-bias would have more easily led reasoners to the correct conclusion. In 
congruent syllogisms, belief-bias improves subject accuracy as past knowledge 
provides an intuitive bias leading them towards a judgement that coincidentally agrees 
with the formal validity of the syllogism. On more challenging multiple-model problems, 
or problems more prone to errors of conversion (misrepresentation of the premises), 
where the formal system would have more difficulty arriving at the correct conclusion, 
the heuristic system can influence the judgment process towards the correct solution. 
With this benefit removed, frontotemporal patients showed impairment in accuracy on 
congruent syllogisms. 
Patients with bilateral parietal lesions, associated with formal reasoning through 
manipulation of spatial representations (Goel et al., 2000), were impaired on 
incongruent syllogisms where more deliberate and formal reasoning processes could 
have been used to oppose – pre-potent and incorrect - belief-biased responding 
patterns. It is implied that those with damage to the bilateral parietal areas are less 
capable of applying formal reasoning through methods, like mental models theory, to 
solve categorical syllogisms. This congruency effect on reasoning was successfully 
replicated in the computational model using these separate but interacting formal and 
heuristic mechanisms; this replication was done in a way such that the accuracy of 
responses generated was highly correlated to the human data. 
 Incongruent syllogisms were more difficult and took longer to solve than 
congruent syllogisms for both model and human data (all ps < .001) demonstrating that 
syllogistic processing is not entirely driven by beliefs. Multiple-model syllogisms were 
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also more difficult and took longer to solve than single-model syllogisms. These results 
provides necessary, though not sufficient, evidence for formal representational 
reasoning processes in human brains. Syllogisms with unbelievable conclusions also 
more frequently evoked these formal reasoning processes by demonstrating 
significantly increased mean accuracies in model and human data than is seen for 
syllogisms with believable conclusions.  
The interacting effects of belief and validity on accuracy seen in the human and 
model data is in compliance with the frequently cited results of Evans, Barston, and 
Pollard (1983) and other studies replicating these results (Klauer, Musch, & Naumer, 
2000; Stupple & Ball, 2008). Evans et al. (1983) observed the lowest accuracy (29%) for 
invalid-believable incongruent syllogisms, moderate accuracy (56%) for valid-
unbelievable incongruent problems, high accuracy (89%) for valid-believable congruent 
problems, and the highest accuracy (90%) for invalid-unbelievable congruent problems. 
This pattern is reflected in the human and model data for this set of syllogisms, and the 
values found for each are highly similar (see Figure 35).  
 Figure 31 
 Model data which is in agreement with human data and past research is very 
appealing, though one must speak to the divergences in performance as well. If these 
divergences cannot be explained, it brings into question the viability of a fractionated 
deductive reasoning system, arranged in this way, for being a potential model of true 
human performance. The main divergence between the model and human data lies in 
the different interpretations of the significant believability by validity interaction for 
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reaction time. For the model data, unbelievable-valid incongruent problems were the 
slowest, while believable-invalid incongruent problems were slowest for human data, 
which agrees with typical findings in past research (Stupple et al., 2011). Stupple et al. 
suggest a sub-group of individuals more frequently understand the underlying logic of 
these problems, and attempt to resist fallacious conclusions through formal reasoning. 
This requires processing effort above and beyond that of other problems in order to 
resist the belief-bias effect – found to be stronger for syllogisms with believable 
conclusions. These high-logic individuals typically take longer to solve syllogisms 
overall, but this is especially true for believable-invalid problems. 
 Attempting to repeat the results of Stupple et al. (2011) showed only marginally 
success at reproducing a reaction time difference across all syllogisms between the 
high and low logic groups (p = .110) in the human data. However, the human high-logic 
group was significantly slower on believable-invalid problems (p = .020) as predicted by 
past research. For the computational model, the initial parameters of subjects mostly 
vary in the application of lesion damage. There is no distinction made for those with a 
more logical cognitive style which is more apt to resist belief-bias. If such a distinction 
were added, it would become possible for an increase in reaction time to emerge for 
believable-invalid problems. This would also be one part of the remedy for increasing 
the low variability, in terms of standard errors, found for the model data compared to 
human data for reaction time results. 
 The final part of the remedy for this problem of low variability in reaction time for 
model data comes from the deterministic nature of the formal mental model system in 
the construction of alternate models. Experiments by Bucciarelli and Johnson-Laird 
(1999) had participants construct alternate models of premises to refute conclusions to 
categorical syllogisms using cut-out shapes or pen and paper methods. While 
participants did search for counter-examples in ways that utilized the major operations 
of the mental model program – adding or moving tokens and breaking entities in two – 
they varied considerably from one another in what they did, and even the same 
participant could vary when encountering a similar problem twice. Construction of a 
grammar with alternate rules allowing for alternate ways to modify or represent 
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problems would add more variability to the model generation process. It could add a 
greater potential for occasionally largely increased reaction times that is presently 
lacking. For example, the current computational model will add all tokens it can possibly 
add at once during the add-token operation; the number of tokens added and the order 
in which this is done could vary.  
The high versus low logic distinction could also generate differences in model 
formulation, and adjust the degree to which finding a model that agrees with a belief 
influences decision-making. Low-logic individuals could apply more “satisficing” (Evans, 
2007) searches which look for a single model that supports a belief, and if it is found, 
decide that their belief is correct. High-logic individuals in contrast could be more apt to 
employ more exhaustive and analytical approaches which require a conclusion to be 
true in all models to be valid. One major concern highlighted by Bucciarelli and 
Johnson-Laird (1999) in their computational model, that reasoners do not adopt fixed 
interpretations for each kind of premise, is already employed in this model through 
errors of conversion and faulty implications. One final difference was noted in this paper 
that was not implemented in the current model. Reasoners demonstrated a marked 
difference in understanding what constituted a proper refutation of an O-type conclusion 
(‘Some X are not Y’) often using a model showing ‘Some X are Y’ as a refutation; they 
were far less successful at refuting syllogisms in this mood (35% accuracy) compared to 
other moods: A-type (‘All X are Y’) 72%, I-type (‘Some X are Y’) 66%, E-type (‘No X are 
Y’) 82%. The computational model as-is can recognize correct refutations with relatively 
equal ability. A more complete discussion of possible modifications to the falsification 
process are beyond the scope of this topic, though their investigation would prove 
useful for ensuring stronger correlations between simulated and human performance 
measures. 
 The computational model displays highly significant accuracy correlations to 
human data across all lesion groups. The significant congruency by group interaction for 
accuracy provides a link for distinct analytical and heuristic reasoning strategies to 
different areas of the brain. Frontotemporal areas support belief-driven responses, while 
bilateral parietal areas support spatial manipulation of models for formal analytical 
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procedures. The performance measures for human and model data show a high degree 
of coherence between each other, and with previous research. The model itself is able 
to incorporate cognitive biases like the atmosphere and congruency effect into one 
system, and provide an account for systematic errors in misrepresenting premises. 
Other explanations of human reasoning over syllogisms can provide piece-wise theories 
or models of aspects of reasoning, but few can demonstrate such a wide variety of 
coherence all at once. Adding distinctions in performance due to cognitive style, a 
differential preference for heuristic or analytical search, may improve the fit to human 
data; though what has been demonstrated presently provides compelling evidence for a 
fractionated deductive reasoning system which involves different but interactive 
reasoning strategies. 
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6.2 Theoretical Discussion 
 Returning to the discussion of theories of the structure of the reasoning mind, a 
fractionated system of deductive reasoning appears to be in the strongest position to 
account for our intuitions of rational behaviour, neuropsychological evidence, and 
behavioural evidence of deductive reasoning. Massive modularity suggests a diverse 
and isolated network of evolutionarily specified modules which quickly and reactively 
respond to environmental stimuli, similar to that of a reflex arc. Similar to reflexes, these 
modules would tend to exhibit a trait of cognitive impenetrability – meaning we are 
unable to be consciously aware of nor influence the activity of these reasoning modules 
– though this contrasts with our intuitive understanding of what rational behaviour is. 
Rational choices are thought to be selected for a reason: to provide reasoned means for 
satisfying the goals we choose to pursue. Rational actions should demonstrate a gap 
between stimulus and response for some degree of decision-making or weighing of 
alternatives to occur. Environmental conditions should not be sufficient for rational 
action as it would be for reflexive action. Cognitively impenetrable modules supporting 
reasoning would ultimately deny that deliberate reasoning even occurs. Furthermore, 
rigid and evolutionarily specified modules supporting reasoning would be unable to 
exhibit the vast variability in performance between participants, or even for a single 
participant on similar syllogisms as noted by Bucciarelli and Johnson-Laird (1999). 
A simple heuristics account which suggests multiple modules supporting only an 
inductive-heuristic reasoning system also fails to account for neuropsychological 
evidence. Reasoning with familiar material often recruits a frontotemporal network, and 
unfamiliar or content-free material recruits a bi-lateral parietal network. If a fractionated 
heuristics system explained all reasoning, it is difficult to explain how linguistic or 
spatially relevant networks could be preferentially recruited depending upon content. 
The probabilistic heuristics model (PHM) proposed by Chater and Oaksford (1999) does 
make an attempt to explain activation of the conflict detection system as a result of 
conflicts among heuristics suggesting different conclusions. However, it is unclear how 
they would justify this distinction between linguistic and spatial network recruitment, as 
53 
 
their decision heuristics largely appear to draw upon linguistic inferences concerning the 
likely meanings of specific terms. 
 If we suggest that heuristics, or even rigid modules, are the primary driver of 
reasoning behaviour, we are also left with the difficult task of explaining how deliberate 
reasoning can take place at all. Bucciarelli and Johnson-Laird (1999) had participants 
manipulate cut-out shapes or use pen and paper to create their own models of 
situations as they tried to reason, with little instruction beyond to try and construct a 
picture of the premises to see which of the provided conclusions held. Use of operations 
similar to the mental models program were observed by subjects in these experiments. 
Bucciarelli and Johnson-Liard (1999) suggest these participants are not merely 
generating conclusions in accordance with atmosphere, nor are they selecting 
conclusions that match least informative premises like with the matching bias of PHM. 
Without a system supporting styles of reasoning other than intuitive assumptions from 
probable linguistic inferences, it is difficult to imagine how this task is accomplished by 
untrained individuals. Unless one is prepared to suggest that construction of models for 
reasoning is epiphenomenal and bears no impact on judgements. 
 Furthermore, the participants of the Vietnam Head Injury study, as well as the 
study by Stupple et al. (2011), showed a distinction between high and low logic 
individuals. High logic individuals took more time and showed a greater resistance to 
belief-bias heuristics to ensure greater performance – particularly for believable-invalid 
problems. Differences in the cognitive style of reasoning, and the brain networks 
recruited for different methods of approach, pose problems for many theories of logical 
reasoning. Simple heuristics or massive modularity have limited ability to explain this 
wide variation. A pure mental models or mental logic approach fails to account for 
belief-bias effects of reasoning, and why networks not related to their approach may be 
engaged; such as how mental logic explains visuospatial engagement, or how mental 
models explain linguistic network engagement. 
 A pure mental logic approach is constrained by the formal rules of logic. The 
inferential roles of logical terms completely determines a course of action which is 
unable to support the congruency effect. It lacks an explainable method for introducing 
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differences due to belief into the logical calculus, or why syllogisms with unbelievable 
conclusions would tend to be subject to a more rigorous degree of analysis than those 
with believable conclusions. Mental logic would have little methods for interaction with 
belief, and would have to be completely disregarded and overridden by a belief-heuristic 
system.  
A pure mental models approach is also similarly constrained by logical rules, 
though a belief-bias system can be introduced to interfere with the search for alternate 
models. In a less pure version of mental model theory, belief-bias may cause an early 
termination in logical procedure if the initial model agrees with held beliefs. When 
attempting to construct alternate models, individuals may have increased difficulty in 
constructing models that are implausible to held beliefs. The application of formal rules 
through mental logic does not have the benefit of this affordance. As is explained in 
more detail by Johnson-Laird (2010) logic is monotonic, and as more premises are 
added the number of potentially valid conclusions increases, including a large number 
of silly but logically valid assertions. Humans are instead agents exhibiting rationality 
bounded by the constraints of time and limited cognitive resources. Creation of a 
problem space with incremental alterations in the form of alternate mental models 
provides a more time-optimized solution to deductive reasoning problems. Constraining 
this problem space further through a belief-bias system conserves costly cognitive 
resources, and allows effects like the congruency effect to surface.  
 As an example of what would happen to our results with a more pure logic 
system, the computational model was run on the syllogisms while excluding the 
heuristic system from participating. While this represents a pure mental models 
approach, its adherence to formal rules extends its implications to a pure mental logic 
approach as well. Occasional errors through mispresenting or converting premises was 
maintained in the general pattern completer in this simulation. As the results in Figure 
36 demonstrate – with a pure mental model system employed on the left – the lines 
representing the accuracies of syllogisms with believable or unbelievable conclusions 
across valid and invalid problems becomes much more parallel, which effectively 
eliminates the congruency effect due to belief-bias. This demonstrates the necessity of 
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providing some plausible method for including a belief-driven heuristic system in the 
explanation of human deductive reasoning. 
 Figure 32 
 As the current investigation was contained largely to the formal and heuristic 
systems, the architecture demonstrated here does not deeply diverge from less 
assumptive (and more conservative) dual-mechanism theories. It bears the closest 
resemblance to parallel-cooperative (Barbey & Sloman, 2007) dual-mechanism theory, 
which proposes formal and heuristic systems operate in parallel and provide input to 
some conflict resolution process. Further research into the operation of the uncertainty 
maintenance system, or other future proposed systems, may help distinguish a 
fractionated deductive reasoning system of reasoning from conservative dual-
mechanism theories. 
 Behavioural evidence can suggest particular modes of reasoning, and 
neurological investigations can tie these modes or functions to particular brain areas. 
Computational modelling, however, provides a means for testing different methods of 
organizing these system components to create better approximations of how these 
components interact. The computational model suggested here has successfully 
provided significant correlations with the accuracies of a number of human lesion 
groups. It has done so by incorporating various published biases of belief and 
atmosphere into a number of interacting systems: the formal system supported by a bi-
lateral parietal network, the heuristic system through the frontotemporal network, the 
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prefrontal cortex general pattern completer, and uncertainty and conflict detection 
mechanisms. It has done so even without a highly flexible and variable alternate model 
generation process. Limitations with the subject pool prevented a deeper examination of 
these last two systems, though working within these limitations has still provided 
evidence for a fractionated system supporting deductive reasoning. 
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Appendix A: Patient Group Lesions 
Bilateral Parietal Patients    
Patient 
ID 
BA 7 
(right) 
BA 40 
(right) BA 7 (left) 
BA 40 
(left) Total 
230 0.24 0.00 42.18 4.36 46.78 
408 15.11 8.02 0.00 0.00 23.13 
439 0.65 19.06 0.00 0.00 19.71 
1061 0.02 15.44 0.00 0.00 15.46 
1298 0.00 22.95 0.00 0.00 22.95 
1324 7.73 56.65 0.00 0.00 64.38 
1341 11.17 0.00 51.42 1.73 64.32 
1366 0.00 20.86 0.00 0.00 20.86 
1434 30.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 30.50 
1443 0.00 33.61 0.00 0.00 33.61 
1461 17.01 12.47 0.00 0.00 29.48 
1510 0.00 0.00 1.09 27.18 28.27 
1621 0.00 0.00 20.82 6.84 27.66 
2005 16.48 0.19 3.38 0.00 20.05 
2028 10.33 27.27 0.42 0.04 38.06 
2116 29.54 33.48 22.20 32.17 117.39 
2341 0.00 0.04 32.75 17.09 49.88 
3081 57.57 0.21 0.00 0.00 57.78 
* damage in a BA is represented as a % proportion of that area  
 
Frontotemporal Patients (left hemisphere)  
Patient 
ID 
BA 21 
(left) 
BA 22 
(left) 
BA 47 
(left) Total 
5 10.44 2.49 11.61 24.54 
103 7.83 24.05 0.00 31.88 
181 12.30 23.06 0.20 35.56 
182 0.00 1.24 26.02 27.26 
318 0.00 0.00 10.64 10.64 
473 25.06 11.73 9.80 46.59 
495 19.63 18.05 0.00 37.68 
528 0.00 5.90 6.89 12.79 
1003 17.74 17.42 3.62 38.78 
1127 1.02 9.88 10.13 21.03 
1433 9.76 30.29 0.00 40.05 
1561 0.04 0.00 9.96 10.00 
1715 19.71 19.42 0.00 39.13 
2135 0.00 0.10 23.08 23.18 
2146 1.44 0.25 10.85 12.54 
2288 3.11 24.86 0.00 27.97 
2386 0.00 4.36 25.24 29.60 
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Appendix B: Human Demographics 
Measure 
Controls  
(N = 37) 
Parietal Patients  
(N = 18) 
Frontotemporal 
Patients  
(N = 17) 
Age (years) 59.27 (3.78) 58.11 (3.32) 58.89 (3.53) 
Education (years) 14.49 (4.29) 14.68 (4.36) 14.42 (4.00) 
CT Total  
Volume Loss (cm3) 0 29.05 (22.43) 30.24 (22.37) 
WAIS Verbal IQ 110.41 (12.28) 103.47 (13.00) 108.47 (16.17) 
WAIS Performance IQ 111.86 (12.25) 99.28 (14.85) 103.16 (16.75) 
WAIS Full IQ 111.92 (11.65) 102.67 (12.06) 106.63 (17.06) 
WAIS Working Memory 106.19 (12.74) 92.83 (12.28) 100.63 (19.15) 
WMS Working Memory 106.84 (13.36) 98.00 (12.94) 101.32 (16.18) 
WMS General Memory 107.62 (12.96) 102.05 (16.92) 94.32 (15.40) 
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Appendix C: Categorical Syllogisms 
LEGEND 
Bel = Believable conclusion 
Unbel = Unbelievable conclusion 
Con. = Conclusion congruent with belief 
Incon. = Conclusion incongruent with belief 
V = Conclusion Logically Valid 
NV = Conclusion Logically Invalid 
SM = Single-model problem 
MM = Multiple-model problem 
[1] all fruit are pears   
all bananas are fruit 
no bananas are pears 
 Bel-NV   Incon. SM 
[2] all cars have four wheels  
no scooters have four wheels 
no scooters are cars 
 Bel-V   Con. SM 
[3] all gods are immortals   
no immortals are men 
no men are gods 
 Bel-V Con. SM 
[4] all bikes are red    
some bikes are broken 
no broken bikes are red 
 Unbel-NV Con. SM 
[5] all airplanes can fly   
some boats can not fly 
some boats are not airplanes 
 Bel-V Con. MM 
[6] no liquids are red   
all paints are liquids 
some paints are red 
 Bel-NV Incon. SM 
[7] no cuban cigars are dogs  
no cuban cigars are cats 
no cats are dogs 
 Bel-NV Incon. MM 
[8] no coffee contains nicotine  
no nicotine contains tea 
no tea contains coffee 
 Bel-NV Incon. MM 
 
 
 
[9] no skiers are smokers   
some men are not skiers 
all men are smokers 
 Unbel-NV Con. SM 
[10] no cats have stripes   
some tigers are cats 
Some tigers do not have stripes 
 Unbel-V Incon. MM 
[11] no poisons are sold at the grocers  
some mushrooms are sold at the grocers 
some mushrooms are not poisons    
 Bel-V Con. MM  
[12] no men are children  
some men are girls 
all girls are children 
 Unbel-NV Con. SM 
[13] no olympic runners are smokers  
some smokers are not men 
some men are olympic runners  
 Bel-NV Incon. SM 
[14] some felines have gills 
all felines are cats 
some cats have gills 
 Unbel-V Incon. SM 
[15] some apples are sweet fruit 
all sweet fruit are grapes 
some grapes are apples 
 Unbel-V Incon. SM 
[16] no fruit are blue 
some apples are fruit 
all apples are blue 
 Unbel-NV Con. SM 
[17] some dogs do not have ears  
all dogs are german sheperds 
some german sheperds do not have ears 
 Unbel-V Incon. MM 
[18] some italians are not martians  
no french are Italians 
some french are martians 
 Unbel-NV Con. SM 
[19] some mice are not rabbits  
some cats are not mice 
some cats are not rabbits 
 Bel-NV Incon. MM 
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Appendix D: Correlation Graphs 
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